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COMPANY, a corporation, 
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vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEM-! 
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for a rehearing in e,ach of the above entitled cases, and 
as grounds for rehearing represents and shows: 
1. That this court, in deciding the cases, misunder-
stood or misconceived some of the essential facts, as 
a result of which, the court's decision is based on a 
misapprehension of certain fundamental facts. 
2. In deciding the case, the court proceeded on an 
erroneous theory, based in part, on a misunderstanding 
of the facts. 
3. The court failed to consider the principal con-
tention asserted by the Hartford for reversal of the 
judgments below. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THAT THIS COURT, IN DECIDING THE CASES, MIS-
UNDERSTOOD OR MISCONCEIVED SOME OF THE ES-
SENTIAL FACTS, AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE COURT'S 
DECISION IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF CER-
TAIN FUNDAMENTAL FACTS. 
The factual background out of which these three 
cases arises is extremely complicated, and although there 
are no large areas of dispute in the record, there have 
been some conflicting claims of counsel as to what the 
record shows, as a result of which we feel that the court 
has been mislead and drawn into making certain assump-
tions of fact, believing that there was a conflict in the 
evidence, when in fact there was none. We therefore feel 
constrained to call to the court's .attention certain matters 
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which are of importance to the ultimate decision of the 
cases. 
1. The court's opinion recites' as follows: 
"Soon after operations commenced the pro-
ject ran into difficulties largely because this 
'straight line' system did not accommodate itself 
to the sales program, either in sequence of con-
struction or in amount." (Emphasis ours) 
We believe that it would be more correct to say, 
that Felt's sales program did not accommodate itself 
to Cassady's construction program. There is nothing 
in any contract, and we challenge counsel for any of 
the parties to call to the attention of the court any con-
tractual provision, which required Cassady to accom-
modate himself to Felt's sales program. His commitment 
was to "supervise, co-ordinate and procure" the con-
struction of 100 homes on contiguous lots. He was en-
titled to be paid for his work performed, according to 
the exact stage of construction of each home, at two 
week intervals, with no qualification whatsoever, as to 
whether the home was sold or not sold. Felt specifically 
admitted this in its own brief, page 23. 
2. The court also says: 
"Cassady's funds gradually became tied up 
in homes upon which he could not receive loan 
proceeds so he was unable to pay his help and 
material suppliers." 
It would be more correct to say that because Felt 
failed to pay Cassady the course of construction pay-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ments provided in the primary construction contract, and 
also in the disbursal agreement, Cassady was unable to 
•p,ay his help and material suppliers. I t was well known 
by all parties to the agreement, that Cassady had no 
substantial capital, and that he relied on course of con-
struction payments to keep the project moving. Prac-
tically every witness who took the stand admitted that 
course of consruction payments were never made timely. 
(T. 62, 64, 65, 67, 235, 236, 258, 262, 321, 347), and Felt 
itself specifically admitted this to be the fact in its own 
brief on appeal. (Felt brief, pp. 22, 23). This court ap-
parently also recognized this to be true in stating that 
"homes nearly completed often wanted for pur-
chasers . . . " Elsewhere this court said: 
"While it may seem that the only practical 
way Cassady could have operated would have 
been to get money on each house as construction 
progressed, whether it had been sold or not, the 
fact is that the contract did not so require." 
The exact opposite is true. For the convenience of 
the Court we quote the relevant portion of paragraph 
23 of the construction contract: 
"The foregoing schedule is to be used as a 
general guide. However, it is agreed that dis-
bursements will be made to second par ty and the 
subcontractors in accordance with the actual stage 
of completion of each dwelling within five days 
after the inspections are made" (Emphasis ours.) 
Essentially the same provision was included in the 
disbursal agreement, (Ex. Pr. 8, paragraph 5, together 
with Ex. B. thereof. These provisions were never changed 
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by any subsequent agreement including the supplemental 
agreement of February 16, 1951. 
Cassady was therefore, entitled to rely on course of 
construction payments as provided in the contracts, with-
out reference to Felt's sales program. To say that he 
failed to accommodate himself to Felt's sales program 
is to cast upon him, by innuendo, a duty which he never 
contracted to undertake, and to deprive him of rights 
which he specifically contracted to receive. 
3. The court states that Prudential Savings was 
authorized under the supplemental agreement to with-
hold progress payments until corrections were made so 
that construction would meet V. A. inspections, and that 
Prudential Savings "was given sole discretion to pay 
out the funds in such manner ,as in their judgment would 
expeditiously move the project forward to completion." 
There was, however, a qualification to this also. It was 
specifically provided in the supplemental agreement as 
follows: 
"In no event, however, shall the payments 
be less than those prescribed in this paragraph 
23 [of the Construction Contract] prior to this 
amendment." 
In short, Cassady ?s right to course of construction 
payments in accordance with the exact stage of comple-
tion as guaranteed in his original agreement with Felt 
was specifically preserved in detail in the disbursing 
agreement, and was likewise expressly and specifically 
preserved intact in the supplemental agreement, and was 
never altered, modified, rescinded or abrogated by any 
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agreement between the parties, oral or written, at any 
time during the course of the work. 
4. I t is stated in the court's opinion that Cassady 
had made no complaint against Felt up to the time of 
the supplemental agreement. The exact opposite is true. 
Exs. H-32, 33, 34, consist of a sheaf of letters of protest 
written by Cassady to Felt, Prudential Federal and 
Accountants, complaining of the failure to make timely 
progress payments and pointing out the difficulties ac-
cruing to Cassady as a result thereof. Cassady repeatedly 
protested, both orally and in writing, the failure of 
Felt to make progress payments timely. This also is 
without dispute. 
5. The opinion of the court further recites as fol-
lows : 
"The trial court found that Hartford did 
become a party to the supplemental contract by 
giving its approval to the modifications of the 
portions of the original contract which it desired 
to have modified without expressly limiting its 
agreement to the other parts of the supplemental 
agreement." 
The exact language of the Hartford's concurrence 
in the supplemental agreement is as follows: 
"HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEM-
NITY COMPANY, as surety on the bond of CAS-
SADY COMPANY, INC., does hereby consent to 
amended paragraphs 22 and 23, and 7 of the Con-
struction contract in connection with which its 
bond has been given." (Pr-6). (Emphasis ours.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
This likewise is without dispute. There is no ques-
tion of making a proper finding of fact. If there is any 
issue, it is an issue of law to determine the correct inter-
pretation of this language. However, in view of the fact 
that the Hartford refused to sign the contract generally, 
and that by the express language of its endorsement it 
limited its consent to .amended paragraphs 22, 23 and 7 
of the construction contract, we do not see upon what 
basis it can be held that it concurred in any modification 
of any other agreement. Nor does Prudential Federal 
contend to the contrary. In fact, it specifically admits, 
,at page 25 of its brief, that " Hartford placed a limited 
approval" on the supplemental agreement, and "it en-
dorsed its consent to only the changes in that construc-
tion contract." 
6. The Court further recites as follows: 
"Furthermore, Hartford seemed perfectly 
willing, and did accept the benefits of the exten-
sion of time, the increase in price per house and 
of disbursement prior to V. A. approval for their 
principal Cassady." 
The extension of time may have been something of 
a benefit to the Hartford, but also it was something of 
a liability, since it extended the Hartford's obligation 
under its bond. Had the Hartford refused to concur in 
the extension, it could have stepped in at the time of 
the supplemental contract, and completed the project 
at its own expense which the evidence shows without 
dispute would have been substantially less than the 
amount for which it has been held liable in the court 
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below. Although it is alleged in the brief of Prudential 
Federal, that there was an increase in the price per 
house to Cassady ,a comparison of the original construc-
tion contract with the supplemental agreement will show 
that this is not so. The only difference w,as that the 
number of houses of different types was changed some-
what but there was no change whatsoever in the unit 
cost of houses, and there was no substantial increase 
in the remuneration to be received by Cassady. Neither 
w,as there any added benefit to the Hartford by reason 
of a provision for disbursement, prior to V. A. approval, 
since such could be and was done under the original 
agreement. In short, Hartford got no benefits whatso-
ever from the supplemental agreement, and merely con-
sented to the extension of time to give the parties an 
opportunity to work out their own salvation. 
7. While it is true, as observed by the court, that 
knowledge of Cassady's limited finances is partly what 
prompted the parties to insist that he procure a perform-
ance bond, the same knowledge, no doubt prompted the 
Hartford to insist, as ,a provision in the bond, that Cas-
sady be timely paid for the work performed. Quite ob-
viously, if he were not paid for the work performed 
in accordance with the provisions of the construction 
contract the project was foredoomed to failure. 
In summary, the court has apparently taken the 
view that Cassady was bound to accommodate his con-
struction schedule to the sales program of Felt, and that 
by failing to do so, he in some fashion breached a duty 
(of unknown origin), resulting in the failure of the pro-
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ject. The exact opposite is true. Cassady had no obliga-
tion to conform to the Felt sales program, but was 
entitled as a matter of absolute contract right, as set 
forth in every agreement to which he was a party, to 
be paid in accordance with the exact stage of construc-
tion of each individual unit without any reference what-
soever to whether it was sold or not. The evidence was 
without dispute that Felt breached its contract obliga-
tions, as it has itself admitted in its brief, that by reason 
thereof Cassady got into difficulties that proved to be 
inextricable, and as a result of which the project failed. 
POINT II. 
IN DECIDING THE CASE, THE COURT PROCEEDED 
ON AN ERRONEOUS THEORY, BASED IN PART, ON A 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRINCIPAL 
CONTENTION ASSERTED BY THE HARTFORD FOR RE-
VERSAL OF THE JUDGMENTS BELOW. 
It appears to us that the court has lost sight of the 
principal contention advanced by the Hartford for re-
versal of the judgments below. It has decided the cases 
essentially on a theory of causation, analogous to that 
doctrine as it exists in the law of torts. In its opinion 
the court states that it is the "Harford's contention 
that Cassady's failure to perform was in reality caused 
by various breaches by plaintiffs," (emphasis ours), etc. 
And in concluding that phase of its decision, the court 
says, "that it was not unreasonable for the trial court 
to refuse to make the finding contended for by defend-
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ants, that the cause of Cassady's failure was breaches 
by Felt/7 (emphasis ours.), etc., "and/or Prudential." 
This approach wholly fails to take into account the 
real claim of the Hartford in this matter. That claim 
was set forth in detail under Point V in our original 
brief. The failure to appreciate its significance may have 
resulted from the fact that it was one of the later points 
argued in our brief. However, so that there may now be 
no misunderstanding whatsoever, as to our position, we 
set forth the following: 
As we believe we have demonstrated under Point I 
hereof, Gassady was entitled to course of construction 
payments in accordance with the exact stage of comple-
tion of each unit, and at approximately fortnightly inter-
vals, and this right was guaranteed to him, not only 
by the construction contract, but also by the disbursal 
agreement, and was preserved inviolate in the supple-
mental agreement. The Hartford's bond, specifically 
provided as follows: 
"The SURETY shall not be liable under the 
Bond to the Obligees, and either of them, unless 
the Obligees, or either of them, shall m,ake pay-
ment to the PRINCIPAL in reasonable compli-
ance with the terms of said contract as to pay-
ments, and each shall perform all other obligations 
to be performed by each obligee under said con-
tract at the time and in the manner therein set 
forth." (Emphasis ours.) 
This language provided, in clear and unmistakable 
terms, that the obligees should make payment to the 
principal in treasonable compliance ivith the terms of 
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the contract as to payments, and perform all other obli-
gations to be performed by the several obligees in the 
time, and in the manner, set forth in their contractual 
obligations. Since it is without dispute that Felt was 
never relieved by contract from its obligation to make 
course of construction payments to Cassady, and since 
the record shows without dispute that course of con-
struction payments were never timely made, the truly 
crucial issue in this case is whether the above language 
defeats the rights of Pacific Coast Title Insurance Com-
pany and Prudential Federal. As we see it, there can 
be no question that it defeats the rights of Felt. 
The foregoing provision of the bond was quoted in 
our brief in two separate places, pages 11 and 44. It 
was recognized by Prudential Federal as the crucial 
issue in its case and was quoted in its brief in no less 
than four different places, (pages 4, 21, 63 and 71). 
It was likewise recognized by Pacific Coast Title In-
surance Company as the crucial issue in its case and was 
quoted at page 4 and again at page 23 of its brief. 
We are disturbed that this vital provision which 
apparently all the parties recognized as the crucial point 
of the case, was not even mentioned in the court's opin-
ion. We are particularly regretful, if our own placement 
of the discussion of this particular point at a later 
stage in our brief, mislead the court into believing that 
we did not attach great significance to it. It was so 
placed in our brief because we felt that the points which 
preceded it, chronologically, were necessary to lay a 
proper foundation for a proper discussion by us, and a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
proper understanding by the court of this vital point. 
Since the court has not even mentioned the point 
in its opinion, we can do no better than to invite the 
court's attention to our discussion of this problem under 
Point V, pages 43 to 51 inclusive, of our original brief, 
and to request the court, that at this time that it consider 
the arguments there advanced. We can do no more here, 
than to state as clearly as we know how, that the issue 
is not whether the ultimate failure of the project was 
caused by breaches of the plaintiffs in their contractual 
obligations to Cassady, but rather whether the plaintiffs 
may be permitted to recover in the face of the language 
of the bond expressly prohibiting recovery where the 
plaintiffs have failed to perform their own contractual 
obligations, regardless of the causative effect that these 
breaches may have had in producing the ultimate result. 
We also wish to direct to the attention of the court to 
the case of Alhambra-Shumway Mines vs. Alhambra Gold 
Mine Corporation, (Cal. App.), 317 Pac, (2d) 649. That 
case bears on our contention that Felt, having forfeited 
its corporate charter to do business in the State of 
Utah, has no standing to maintain this action. The case 
was decided after our brief was filed and was not pub-
lished in the reporter until after the case was submitted 
to this court on oral arguments in January. In its de-
cision, this court said " tha t it. has found no case dealing 
precisely with the question posed." We believe that the 
case above cited is more similar in point of fact than 
any of those cited in our original brief or any of those 
cited in Felt 's brief, or any of those cited in the opinion 
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of the Court. We believe that it also has substantial 
persuasive value because it is well reasoned, and of very 
recent determination, The facts of that case, insofar as 
material here, are stated in the court's opinion as fol-
lows: 
"During the course of the trial it was dis-
covered that respondent, a foreign corporation, 
had not paid its franchise taxes for a number of 
years. Appellant thereupon moved to strike all 
pleadings and evidence of respondent and to enter 
the default of respondent upon the ground that 
as a foreign corporation it had forfeited its right 
to transact business in California, including the 
right to defend this action, This motion was de-
nied by the trial court upon the submission of 
the case. The parties stipulated that ,a certificate 
of suspension or forfeiture as of August 1, 1950, 
from the Secretary of State might be received 
in evidence. . . . Judgment in favor of respondent 
was entered on August 23, 1955. On September 
19, 1955, appellant filed a notice of intention to 
move for a new trial and also filed a corrected 
certificate of the Secretary of State reciting that 
the rights of respondent corporation to transact 
intrastate business were forfeited on August 1, 
1950, and had not been reinstated. At the hearing 
of the motion for a new trial on October 28, 1955, 
respondent produced a certificate of revivor, 
showing that respondent's right to do intrastate 
business in California was revived and restored 
to full force and effect on October 28, 1955. The 
motion for a new trial was denied and this appeal 
followed.'' 
In holding that the corporation was not entitled, 
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even to defend the action, having forfeited its corporate 
charter, the court said: 
" In Boyle v. Lakeview Creamery, 9 Cal. 
2d 16, 68 P. 2d 968, the distinction between the 
penalties under section 3669c and penalties for 
failure to pay taxes levied under the Franchise 
Tax Act are clearly set forth. There, the Court 
said . . .: 
" 'From a consideration of these statues, the 
policy is clearly to prohibit the delinquent cor-
poration from enjoying the ordinary privileges 
of a going concern, in order that some pressure 
will be brought to be,ar to force the payment of 
taxes. * * * The statute expressly deprives the 
corporation of all ' corporate powers, rights and 
privileges,' subject to one exception, which is 
specifically set forth, the right to amend the arti-
• cles to change the name. * * V 
"To the same effect are Graceland v. Peeb-
ler, 50 Cal. App. 2d 545, 123 P. 2d 527 and 2 
Witkin California Procedure 1013, as well as the 
cases cited in Eeed v. Norman, supra. Although 
the Boyle case, supra, concerned a domestic 
rather than a foreign corporation, since a domes-
tic corporation is merely suspended while a for-
eign corporation forfeits, the law applicable to the 
lesser situation of suspension should also apply 
to the more drastic penalty of forfeiture. 
•Jv "A* * w w 
" In view of the provisions of section 23301 
of the Eevenue and Taxation Code, and the auth-
orities hereinbefore cited, we believe that there is 
no escape from the conclusion that respondent 
corporation had no right to defend in the instant 
action, or even to participate therein during the 
time that its corporate rights were suspended. 
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Therefore the trial court should have granted 
appellants' motion to strike the pleadings of re-
spondent and certainly the trial court had no right 
to consider the defenses of the statute of limita-
tions, laches, and estoppel which respondent set 
up in its answers. Section 23301 expressly depriv-
ed respondent corporation of all "corporate 
powers, rights and privileges," and the right to 
defend against an action is included in such power, 
rights and privileges. It is true that in the imstant 
case the point was not raised by appellants until 
the final day of the trial and long after the action 
was commenced, but that does not aid respondent 
because the fact remains that the powers, rights 
and privileges of respondent corporation were not 
revived and restored before the entry of the judg-
ment appealed from. 
<<* # # rpj^
 r e S p 0 n ( i e n t corporation having 
forfeited its right to defend against the action or 
to file any pleadings therein, the court erred in 
considering the special defenses of laches, estop-
pel and the statute of limitations raised by re-
spondent. Since the judgment was based upon 
the court's findings in favor of respondent upon 
said special defenses, the judgment in favor of 
respondent corporation is clearly without support 
and must be reversed." (Emphasis ours.) 
I t is respectfully submitted that the evidence shows 
without dispute, and it is conceded by the adverse parties, 
that Cassady did not receive progress payments as pro-
vided by the construction contract, and the later agree-
ments ancillary and supplemental thereto; that by reason 
thereof the Hartford is free of liability to the plaintiffs, 
under the plain provisions of its bond; that Felt has no 
standing to maintain this action; that in affirming the 
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judgments below, the court erred; that this petition 
should be granted; that the court should re-examine the 
facts as disclosed by the record, and examine the con-
tentions of the Hartford with regard to reversal, and 
that the judgments below should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOEETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
By EAY R, CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Company 
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